00100	.SEC A SYMBOL-PROCESSING THEORY OF THE PARANOID MODE
00200	
00300	           
00400	.SS Hypotheses and Presuppositions
00500	
00600		A theory involves a conjunction of  hypotheses ,
00700	auxiliary assumptions and initial conditions. Underlying the theory
00800	are numerous stated and unstated presuppositions. The theory
00900	of  the  paranoid  mode  to  be  described  posits  a  structure   or
01000	organization of interacting symbolic procedures. These procedures and
01100	their interactions are supplemented in the  theory  by  a  number  of
01200	auxiliary  assumptions and presuppositions which will become apparent
01300	as the story unfolds.
01400		I shall first contrast two modes  of  information  processing
01500	activity, one termed "ordinary" and one termed "paranoid".
01600		In the ordinary mode a person  goes  about  his  business  of
01700	everyday	living in a matter-of-fact way. He deals with routine
01800	situations in his environment as  they  arise,  in  the  main  taking
01900	things  at  their face value.  Things and people behave in accordance
02000	with his beliefs and expectations and thus can be managed  routinely.
02100	Only a small amount of attention need be devoted  to  monitoring  the
02200	environment  ,  simply checking that everthing is as expected.   This
02300	placid ongoing sequence can be interrupted by the  the  detection  of
02400	signs  of  alarm  or  opportunity  at  any  time  but the predominant
02500	condition is one of a steady progression of events so ordinary as  to
02600	be uneventful.
02700		In contrast to this routine ordinariness is an arousal  state
02800	of  emergency  .    The  particular  aroused  emergency  I  shall  be
02900	considering describes the paranoid mode of information processing  as
03000	characterized by a wary suspiciousness. A person in paranoid mode can
03100	be compared to a spy in a hostile country.   To  him  everyone  is  a
03200	potential  enemy, a threat to his existence who must be evaluated for
03300	malevolence or harmlessness.  The secret agent is  hypervigilant  and
03400	fully  mobilized  to  attack,  to  flee, to stalk.  In this situation
03500	appearances are not to be taken at face value as ordinary  events  or
03600	background  but  each  is  attended  to  and  interpreted  to  detect
03700	malevolence. Events in the environment, which in  the  ordinary  mode
03800	would  not  be  connected to the self, become referred to the self as
03900	potentially menacing.  The unintended is misinterpreted  as  intended
04000	and  the  undesigned  is  confused  with  the  designed.   Nothing is
04100	unattendible. The predominant intention of the  agent  is  to  detect
04200	malevolence from others.  In paranoid patients the over-riding belief
04300	in and expectation of malevolence on the part  of  others  keeps  the
04400	self  in  an  aroused  alarm  state  ,  a  state  which  occurs  only
04500	occasionally in the ordinary mode of  information  processing.  (MORE
04600	HERE ON EVERDAY PARANOIA ??
04700	(ACCOUNTS OF  PARANOID  MODE  IN  LITERARY  STYLE--CORVO,
04800	HEMINGWAY,HOFSTADER,FOWLES, JOE LOUIS STORY??)
04900	
05000	
05100	
05200		It  is  established  clinical knowledge that the phenomena of
05300	the paranoid mode can be found associated with a variety of  physical
05400	disorders.   For  example, paranoid thinking can be found in patients
05500	with   head   injuries,   hyperthyroidism   hypothyroidism,   uremia,
05600	pernicious   anemia,   cerebral  arteriosclerosis,  congestive  heart
05700	failure, malaria and epilepsy.      Also drug  intoxications  due  to
05800	alcohol,  amphetamines,  marihuana  and LSD can be accompanied by the
05900	paranoid mode. Thus the paranoid mode is not  a  first-order  disease
06000	but  a  way  of  processing  information  in  reaction  to some other
06100	underlying disorder. To  account  for  the  association  of  paranoid
06200	thought  with  these  physical  states  of  illness,  a psychological
06300	theorist might be tempted to  hypothesize  that  an  intentionalistic
06400	cognitive system would attempt to explain a physical illness state by
06500	constructing persecutory  beliefs  blaming  other  human  agents  for
06600	causing the ill-being of the disease state. But before making such an
06700	explanatory move, we must consider the  elusive  distinction  between
06800	reasons and causes in explanations of human behavior.
06900	
07000		When human action is to be explained, confusion easily arises
07100	between  appealing  to  reasons  and appealing to causes, as has been
07200	discussed in detail by Toulmin (1971). One view of the association of
07300	the  paranoid mode with physical disorders might be that the physical
07400	illness simply causes the paranoia ,through some  unknown  mechanism,
07500	at  a  "hardware"  level  beyond  the  influence of deliberate 
07600	reprogramming and beyond  voluntary  self-control.  That  is,  the
07700	resultant  paranoid  mode  represents  something that happens to a
07800	person as victim, not something that he  does  as  an  active  agent.
07900	Another  view  is that the paranoid mode can be explained in terms of
08000	reasons, justifications which  describe  an  agent's  intentions  and
08100	beliefs.   Does  a  person as an agent recognize, monitor and control
08200	what he is doing or trying to do? Or  does  it  just  happen  to  him
08300	automatically  without conscious deliberation? This question raises a
08400	third view, namely that unrecognized reasons, aspects of the  program
08500	which  are  sealed  off  and  inacessible  to  voluntary control, can
08600	function like causes.  Once brought to consciousness such reasons can
08700	be modified voluntarily by the agent, as a language user, reflexively
08800	talking to and instructing himself. This second-order monitoring  and
08900	control  through  language  contrasts  with  an  agent's inability to
09000	modify causes which lie beyond the influence  of  self-criticism  and
09100	change   through   internal  linguistically  mediated  argumentation.
09200	Timeworn  conundrums  about  concepts  of   free-will,   determinism,
09300	responsibility,  consciousness  and  the powers of mental action here
09400	plague us unless we stick closely to a computer analogy which makes a
09500	clear  and  useful  distinction  between  hardware,  interpreter  and
09600	programs. (See p. 000 in Chap 2)
09700	
09800		Each of these three views provides a serviceable  perspective
09900	depending  on how a disorder is to be explained and corrected.   When
10000	paranoid processes occur during amphetamine intoxication  they  might
10100	be viewed as biochemically caused and beyond the patient's ability to
10200	control volitionally through internal self-correcting dialogues  with
10300	himself.  When  a paranoid moment occurs in a normal person it can be
10400	viewed as having a reason or justification.  If the  paranoid  belief
10500	is  recognized as such, a person has the power to revise or reject it
10600	through internal  debate.  Between  these  extremes  of  drug-induced
10700	paranoid  processes  and the self-correctible paranoid moments of the
10800	normal person,  lie  cases  of  paranoid   characters,   paranoid
10900	reactions  and  the paranoid mode associated with the major psychoses
11000	(schizophrenic and manic-depressive).   One opinion has it  that  the
11100	major  psychoses  are  a consequence of unknown "hardware" causes and
11200	are beyond deliberate  voluntary  control.     But  what  are  we  to
11300	conclude about paranoid personalities and paranoid reactions where no
11400	hardware disorder is detectable or suspected?  Are such persons to be
11500	considered  patients  to  whom something is mechanically happening or
11600	are they agents whose behavior is a consequence of what they do?   Or
11700	are  they  both  agent  and patient depending on on how one views the
11800	self-modifiability of their symbolic processing?  In these  enigmatic
11900	cases  we  shall  take  the  position  that  in  normal, neurotic and
12000	characterological  paranoid  modes,  the  psychopathlogy   represents
12100	something  that  happens  to  a  man  as a consequence of what he has
12200	experientially undergone, of something he now does and  something  he
12300	now  undergoes.   Thus  he  is  both  agent and victim whose symbolic
12400	processes  have  powers  to  do  and  liabilities  to  undergo.   His
12500	liabilities are reflexive in that he is victim to and can succumb to,
12600	his own symbolic structures.
12700	
12800		From  this  standpoint  I  would  postulate a duality between
12900	reasons and causes. That is, just as in an algorithm a procedure  can
13000	serve  as  an  input  argument  to  another  procedure,  a reason can
13100	function as a cause in one context and as a justification in another.
13200	Human    symbolic   behavior   is   non-determinate   since   it   is
13300	self-determinate. Thus the power to make some decisions freely and to
13400	change  one's  mind  is non-illusory.  When a reason is recognized to
13500	function as a cause and is accessible to self-monitoring, it  may  be
13600	changed  by  another procedure which takes it as an argument. In this
13700	sense a two-levelled system involving an interpreter and its programs
13800	is self- changeable and self-correcting, within limits.
13900		I  shall first presuppose a schema of intentionalistic action
14000	and non-action which takes the form of a practical inference:
14100		AN AGENT A WANTS SITUATION S TO OBTAIN
14200		A BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER FOR S TO OBTAIN, A MUST DO X
14300		THEREFORE A PLANS, TRIES OR PROCEEDS TO DO X
14400	.END
14500	An  agent  is  taken here to be human.
14600	To do means  to  produce,  prevent  or  allow
14700	something  to  happen. We presuppose the agent's power to do X. X can
14800	be multiple sequential or  concurrent  actions  and  includes  mental
14900	action  (e.g.   deciding) as well as physical action(e.g.talking). It
15000	is also presupposed in this  action-schema  that  ,  in  doing  X,  A
15100	receives  feedback  as  to whether S is coming about, i.e.    whether
15200	doing X is successful or not in obtaining S.
15300	
15400		The major processes here posited to  govern  the  paranoid
15500	mode  involve  an organization of symbol-processing procedures at one
15600	level governed by an interpreter at another level.  I  shall  sketch
15700	the operations of this organization informally.
15800		Presupposed are  "consciencing"  procedures which
15900	judge  an  action,  desire  or  state  of  the  self  to be wrong or
16000	defective according to criteria of sanctioning beliefs.  A  censuring
16100	process then attempts to assign blame to an agent for the wrong.
16200		(2)The  interpreter  attempts a simulation of assigning blame
16300	to the self.  If the self accepts blame, the trial simulation detects
16400	an  affect-signal  of  shame  warning  of  an  eventual undergoing of
16500	humiliation for personal failure or imperfection.  The  detection  in
16600	the  simulation  serves  as  an  anticipatory warning not to actually
16700	execute  this  procedure  since  it  will  result  in   the   painful
16800	re-experiencing of a negative affect-state of humiliation.
16900	An alternative procedure of assigning blame to others  is
17000	next  simulated and found not to eventuate in a painful affect-state.
17100	Hence it is executed. It operates to repudiate that the  self  is  to
17200	blame  for a wrong and to ascribe blame to other human agents. Now it
17300	is not the self who is responsible for a wrong but  it  is  that  the
17400	self is wronged by others.  
17500		These presupposed strategies are inefficient and only
17600	partially  effective  in  the  prevention  of  humiliation.  They can
17700	misfire since the counteractions generated may  result  in  the  self
17800	repeatedly  undergoing  criticisms  and  condemnations  from  others,
17900	exposing the self to incremental  shame  and  humiliation.   Hostile,
18000	antagonistic  and  belittling behavior provokes and alienates others.
18100	The locus of censure is shifted from  the  self  to  others  but  the
18200	countering actions  designed  to  contend with others and redress the
18300	wrongs have paradoxical repercussions tending to amplify rather  than
18400	reduce  the  very states the self is attempting to forestall and ward
18500	off.
18600	
18700		The  above-described  presuppositions  are  not  embodied  as
18800	procedures  in  the  model. The model begins with a scan of the input
18900	searching first for malevolence on the part of the  interviewer.  The
19000	definitions  of  malevolence  are  given  in  Table  000.  Using this
19100	classification scheme  the  model  attempts  identify  the  input  as
19200	malevolent  ,  benevolent or neutral. If the input strategies succeed
19300	in recognizing malevolence, increases in negative affect-states occur
19400	and  output  strategies  are  executed  in  an  attempt to reduce the
19500	other's malevolent effects. If benevolence is detected in the  input,
19600	an  attempt  is made to tell one's story seeking self-affirmation and
19700	self- vindication from the other. If the input is deemed  neutral,  a
19800	neutral nonparanoid response is given.
19900		The above description attempts to summarize informally 
20000	a series of posited operations in an organization of
20100	symbol-processing procedures.    The details of these procedures  and
20200	their  interactions  will  be  made  explicit  when  the algorithm is
20300	described (see p ).
20400		The theory is circumscribed in that it  attempts  to  explain
20500	only  certain symbolic phenomena of a particular type of episode,i.e.
20600	an interview.It does not attempt to explain,  for  example,  why  the
20700	censuring process condemns particular actions or states as wrongs nor
20800	how  any  of  these  procedures  develop  over  time  in  a  person's
20900	paranoidogenic  socialization experience.    Thus it does not provide
21000	an ontogenetic  explanation  of  how  an  organization  of  processes
21100	evolved  and  grew  to  be  the  way  it  is.   The  model is further
21200	circumscribed in that it  offers  an  explanation  only  of  how  the
21300	organization  operates  in  the  ethogenesis of conduct and character
21400	occuring in the present in a psychiatric interview.
21500		Some evidence bearing on the posited processes  will  now  be
21600	discussed.  Evidential support for processes which attempt to contend
21700	with a malevolent other comes from clinical observations  of  normal,
21800	neurotic   and   psychotic  paranoias.   The  agent  may  report  his
21900	self-monitoring directly to an  observer  commenting  that  his,  for
22000	example,  hostile  remarks  are  intended to retaliate for a believed
22100	wrong at the hands of the other. ("I want him  to  feel  bad  and  to
22200	leave  me  alone".)  The  output  actions of the paranoid mode can be
22300	grouped into reducing persecution by retribution  or  by  withdrawal.
22400	Retribution  is  intended  to  drive  the other away while withdrawal
22500	removes the self from the sphere of the other. There does not seem to
22600	be  any  experimental  evidence  bearing  on  this point. Perhaps the
22700	clinical and everyday  observations  are  sufficient  enough  not  to
22800	require any.
22900		The process of scanning for malevolence has both clinical and
23000	experimental  evidence in its behalf.    Clinicians are familiar with
23100	the darting eye-movements of psychotic paranoids. Patients themselves
23200	report   their   hypervigilance   as  intended  to  detect  signs  of
23300	malevolence.   Silverman  [  ]  and  Venables  [  ]   have   reported
23400	experiments  indicating that paranoid schizophrenics more extensively
23500	scan their visual fields and have a greater breadth of attention than
23600	other schizophrenic patients.
23700		In considering the  presuppositions  of  censure  and  blame,
23800	direct  evidence  is  hard  to  come  by  and  hence  such background
23900	assumtions are on shakier ground.  Since  antiquity  it  has  been  a
24000	common  observation  that  paranoids tend to accuse others of actions
24100	and states which  hold  true  for  themselves  according  an  outside
24200	observer.  As Newton, in a classic paranoid clash, said about Leibniz
24300	300 years ago: "he himself is guilty  of  what  he  complains  of  in
24400	others"[  Manuel].   A process of ascription has also been offered to
24500	account   for   the   particular   selectivity   involved   in    the
24600	hypersensitivity  to  criticism.    That  is,  why does a man believe
24700	others will ridicule him about  his  appearance  unless  hef  himself
24800	believes  his appearance to be defective. An alternative view is that
24900	the selectivity  stems  from  an  agent,  uncertain  of  himself  and
25000	observing  how  others  in  his community are censured and ridiculed,
25100	expects the same to be applied to him.
25200		The obscurity of the relation between what the  self  expects
25300	as  malevolence  and the self's own properties is well illustrated in
25400	hypotheses which have attempted to explain the  paranoid  mode  as  a
25500	consequence  of  homosexual  conflict. It has long been observed that
25600	some (not all) paranoid patients are excessively concerned  with  the
25700	topic  of  homosexuality.    Several studies of hospitalized paranoid
25800	schizophrenics show them to be  preoccupied  with  homosexuality  far
25900	more than the nonpsychotic controls.(See Klaf and Davis [ ],etc) Such
26000	evidence may be interpreted as  having  generative  implications  for
26100	certain cases. As a special case in a more general theory of avoiding
26200	humiliation, if homosexual interests are evaluated by  the  censuring
26300	process  as wrong, then the ethogenesis of the paranoid mode on these
26400	grounds becomes plausible. There is also a nonnegligible  probability
26500	that  an  agent,  doubtful  of  his own sexuality, might expect to be
26600	accused of homosexuality in a community which censures homosexuality.
26700	In  such  a  community  homosexuals trying to "pass" are of necessity
26800	suspicious  and  a  bit  paranoid  since  like  the  spy  in  hostile
26900	territory, they must be on guard against stigmatizing detection.
27000		It is obvious that self-censuring processes contribute to the
27100	regulation  of  human  conduct. But are distortions of self-censuring
27200	and blaming processes the ontogenetic  core  of  the  paranoid
27300	mode?  Heilbrun  and  Norbert have shown that paranoid schizophrenics
27400	are more sensitive to maternal censure as measured by the  disruption
27500	of  a  cognitive  task  by a tape-recording of a mother censuring her
27600	son.  [  ]  (Give  anecdotal  examples?  Spassky-Fischer,  Hofstader,
27700	Fowles, Corvo)
27800	.SS Initial Conditions
27900		When  a  theory  is  embodied  in a concrete operating model,
28000	representations  of  lawlike  generalizations   are   combined   with
28100	representations  of  singular  conditions,  usually  termed  "initial
28200	conditions".   In  constructing  a  simulation  one  can  attempt  to
28300	reproduce  the  behavior  of  an actual individual who is a member of
28400	some well-defined class. Another approach, which we  adopted,  is  to
28500	construct  a  hypothetical  individual  whose  symbolic behavior will
28600	cause him to be placed in a certain class, in  this  case  the  class
28700	"paranoid".   The  singular  statements  describing  our hypothetical
28800	individual follow.
28900		He is a 28 year old single Protestant male  who  works  as  a
29000	stockclerk at Sears, a large department store. He has no siblings and
29100	lives alone, seldom seeing his parents. He  is  sensitive  about  his
29200	parents,  his  religion  and  about  sex.  His  hobby  is gambling on
29300	horseracing, both at tracks and through bookies. A few months ago  he
29400	became  involved  in  a  severe  quarrel  with a bookie, claiming the
29500	bookie did not pay off a bet. After the quarrel it  occurred  to  him
29600	that  bookies  pay  protection to the underworld and that this bookie
29700	might gain revenge by having him injured or killed by the  Mafia.  He
29800	is eager to tell his story and to get help in protecting him from the
29900	underworld. He is willing to answer questions  about  non-  sensitive
30000	areas  of his life and offers hints about his delusional system in an
30100	attempt to feel out the interviewer's attitude towards him.
30200		Because  communication  with  the  model  takes  place in the
30300	context of a psychiatric interview using unrestricted  English,  some
30400	problems  of  computer understanding of natural language will next be
30500	discussed.